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This paper surveys the theories of social preferences. Social preferences
are based on that people not only care about their own well-being, but
they have a certain concern with payo⁄s and/or actions of others. We
classify two approaches: distributional and intention-based models, and
later discuss models that combine both theories. In order to provide a
better illustration of the discussed models, we derive predictions of these
models for two classic experimental protocols: ultimatum game and public
good game with punishment. These predictions are compared with the
stylized facts of these two games.
1 Introduction
Although the traditional de￿nition of utility function allows for a broad type of
preferences and the most prominent economists have discussed the importance
of non-sel￿sh preferences in economic theory,1 a large part of applied model-
ing in economics has restricted, and restricts the attention on simple payo⁄
maximization. Firms are assumed to simply maximize their pro￿ts and indi-
viduals are supposed to maximize their own material well-being. However, a
sel￿sh individual only represents a particular case of a more general set-up.
There is a huge number of real-life examples showing that many economic sub-
jects, institutions and humans, satisfy needs di⁄erent from payo⁄maximization.
The goals of non-governmental organizations, charity donations, long-distance
adoption of children from developing countries, parental gifts etc. can serve as
examples of other-regarding behavior. Recently, the development of sophisti-
cated experimental techniques allows to directly test the issues of non-sel￿sh
behavior in controlled laboratory environment. Both real-life observations and
￿I am greatful to Marco Casari, Hubert JÆnos Kiss, Giovanni Ponti and Marco van der
Leij for their e⁄orts while correcting this paper. Financial support from the Spanish Ministry
of Education and Science (AP-2004-1893) is greatfully acknowledged.
yDepartmento de Fundamentos del AnÆlisis Econ￿mico, University of Alicante, Campus
San Vicente, 03080 Alicante, Spain. E-mail: jaromirkovarik@merlin.fae.ua.es.
1See, for instance, Beker (1974), Harsanyi (1955), Sen (1977) and Smith (1976).
1experimental evidence have stimulated a stream of theories, which argue that
human decisions can be based on di⁄erent behavioral grounds than self-interest.
Nowadays, these theories are known as social preferences.
Traditionally, utility function, ui : ￿ ! R, is a function that assigns a
value to each (mixed) strategy pro￿le, such that individual i prefers strategies
that assign her higher utilities. This de￿nition does not imply any particular
function to represent human preferences. Rather, it allows for a great variety of
functional forms to be applied. The preference ordering of a sel￿sh individual is
completely independent of payo⁄s of other involved players, and if two strategy
pro￿les lead to the same payo⁄ the sel￿sh individual is indi⁄erent between the
two strategy pro￿les. Social preferences di⁄er, with respect to self-interest, in
that payo⁄s and/or actions of other players in￿ uence the preference ordering of
agents. As a consequence, two strategy pro￿les does not have to lead to the
same utility even though they bear the same material payo⁄.
Most of the existing models of social preferences do not deviate from the
above de￿nition of utility function. Agents are still maximizing their utili-
ties, but utility maximization does not coincide with payo⁄ maximization, as
it does while working with sel￿sh individuals. Therefore, social preferences re-
quire to strictly distinguish between the utility function and material payo⁄.
Throughout the paper, we always denote individual i￿ s utility function ui and
her material payo⁄ ￿i. The material payo⁄ function, ￿i, is the standard von
Neumann-Morgenstern payo⁄function. Despite the non-sel￿sh nature of agents￿
preferences, the individuals are always assumed to be somehow self-interested.
More precisely, if anything else remains unchanged players prefer more material
well-being to less.2
This paper provides a detailed classi￿cation and characterization of existing
models of social preferences. We are not the ￿rst surveying social preferences.
Chapter 2.8 in Camerer (2003), Fehr and Schmidt (2003) and Sobel (2005)
also review the existing models. Since Camerer (2003) is a brief description of
selected literature, we discuss our contribution with respect to Fehr and Schmidt
(2003) and Sobel (2005).
The motivation of this survey is to provide the researchers from any area
of social sciences a classi￿cation based on the ability of individual models to
predict desired behavioral regularities. Therefore, we do not analyze models
that have already been extended or generalized, even though they are considered
important for the formalization of other theories. Rather, we directly work with
the more general version of the model.3 This is the ￿rst di⁄erence with respect
2The interpretation of ￿ anything else unchanged￿can di⁄er across models. For example, if
people are concerned with their own material payo⁄and their share, the increase of their payo⁄
while remaining the payo⁄ of opponents cannot be interpreted as ￿ anything else unchanged￿ ,
since the agents￿shares have also changed.
3A great example is Rabin (1993), which is considered the father of the formal incorpo-
ration of other-regarding motives into game theory. However, his model has been succesfully
generalized by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Hence, even though we discuss Ra-
bin￿ s contribution in the text, the formal analysis is directly performed using the model of
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger. Similar considerations hold for Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
who generalize Bolton (1991).
2to the other surveys.
Furthermore, this survey can be viewed as complementary to Fehr and
Schmidt, and Sobel. We review the same models of social preferences, but
the analytical tools di⁄er. The main di⁄erence is that, due to the motivation of
this study, we provide formal predictions of each model in standard experimen-
tal games, which allow to see in detail the shortcomings of the corresponding
model that do not have to be obvious without formal analysis. Consequently,
this survey is slightly more technical than both Fehr and Schmidt, and Sobel.4
We follow the literature by distinguishing two types of models: distribu-
tional and intention-based. Distributional models assume that only monetary
consequences matter. Therefore, material payo⁄s of opponents can enter in the
utility function. On the contrary, intention-based theories focus on why (and
which) di⁄erent actions are taken. Within this stream, reciprocity has won main
attention. Reciprocal individuals reward kind actions with kindness and punish
mean behavior. Both approaches provide explanations for many ￿ndings, but
each model fails in some aspects. Thus, we also discuss models that combine
distributional and intentionalist motivations. Troughout the paper, we contrast
and motivate the presented models with behavioral regularities observed in ex-
periments, but the aim of this paper is not to review the experimental ￿ndings
regarding prosocial behavior.5
In the analysis, we focus on ultimatum game and public good game with
punishment. There are several reasons why these two games have been chosen
as a good illustration. Both are widely studied and experimentally tested in the
lab, and strategically very simple under the assumption of self interest. In both
cases, the option to respond to some previous play gives players the possibility to
retaliate opponents￿actions what can, in principle, allow for di⁄erent predictions
depending on whether the corresponding model is purely consequentionalist or
purely intention-based. Both, furthermore, allows for direct comparison with
another, simpler game as the dictator game and the public good game without
the punishment option.6
Now, we brie￿ y review the results of this paper. Table 1 provides a com-
prehensive summary of the predictions of the discussed models in three widely
studied experimental games: dictator game (DG), ultimatum game (UG) and
public good game (PGG) with punishment.7 The rows correspond to the exist-
4Other minor di⁄erences are that, in contrast to Sobel (2005), we concentrate exclusively
on social preferences, abstracting from any other models and motives that can also predict
(apparent) non-sel￿sh behavior, and, in contrast to Fehr and Schmidt (2003), we do not discuss
the possible applications of these theories to economic problems.
5The interested readers are referred to reviews of Camerer (2003) and Kagel and Roth
(1995).
6For similar reasons, we could have also chosen trust/investment game (Berg et al. (1995))
or gift exchange games (Fehr et al. (1993) and (1998)). Nevertheless, we believe that the
additional contribution of the formal analysis of these two games would not compensate the
cost of the additional space necessary to formalize them.
7We also added to the table the dictator game, since it is very simple, leads to clear-cut
predictions, and its close relation with the ultimatum game allows to derive the predictions
trivially from the ultimatum game results. Nevertheless, we do not provide the formal analysis
of this game in the main text.
3ing models of social preferences; the columns list the experimental stylized facts
for each game.
Put Table 1 around here.
It is worth mentioning that the table is illustrative. Each cell in the table
shows whether the corresponding model is cabable to predict the stylized fact,
but it does not show how much the predictions match the experimental obser-
vations and that there may exist additional, implausible equilibria. Therefore,
before any conclusion is made, we recommend to look at the complete analysis
in Chapter 3.
Observe that, in spite of a relatively simple strategic situation of the three
games in Table 1, no model is able to predict all the behavioral regularities.
Distributional models generally fail to predict well in public good game with
punishment. Even though Fehr and Schmidt (1999) seem to be an exception and
can predict any common contribution scenario, they o⁄er no strong arguments
why high contributions are generally observed. On the other hand, the concept
of reciprocity fails to predict pure altruism in the dictator game. In spite of the
idea of combing both approaches, neither this stream of models does better.
Hence, the ￿rst conclusion of our analysis is that we still need a further
empirical and theoretical research to propose a su¢ ciently simple model that
can predict all the experimental ￿ndings.
Second, to use a speci￿c model, one has to couterweight the technical simplic-
ity of ditributional models, among which Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is the most
succesful predicting the observations, against the generality of combinations of
distributional motives and intentions that can capture interesting regularites at
the cost of mathematical complexity. Contrary to informal arguments of the
literature, which stresses the role of intentions, Table 1, jointly with our analy-
sis, suggests that, in spite of its simplicity, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) provide
very reasonably good predictions, and some weak points of Fehr and Schmidt￿ s
model can be overcome by a non-linear version of their model, which we propose
in Section 3.1.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section
discusses two traditionally used experimental games and states the predictions
for a self-interested agent. Section 3 is divided into three parts. The ￿rst
analyzes distributional models. The second part is devoted to intention-based
models. In the third part, models combining both approaches are introduced.
The last section, Section 4, provides with some remarks and suggestions for
future research. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix A and Appendix B
contains technical details of Falk and Fischbacher (2004).
42 Ultimatum game, Public Good Game with
Punishment, and Self Interest
In this section, we introduce two widely used experimental games, ultimatum
game and public good game with punishment, and contrast the model of sel￿sh
individual with the empirical evidence.
Ultimatum game is a two-stage two-player game. In the ￿rst stage, Proposer
proposes a division of a ￿xed amount of money, say 1 monetary unit, giving to
the Responder c 2 [0;1] and leaving 1￿c for herself. Responder can either accept
this division, or reject it. In the former case, the proposed division is realized.
Otherwise, both players receive nothing. With sel￿sh agents, the prediction is:
Proposition 1 In ultimatum game, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of-
fer of a self-interested Proposer is zero. Sel￿sh Responder accepts any o⁄er.
The large experimental evidence on ultimatum game unambiguously rejects
this prediction, and the results does not change considerably across studies. An
early example is the study of G‰ uth et al. (1982). A more recent experiment,
made by Slonin and Roth (1998), con￿rms these observations for high stakes.
Proposers, in general, o⁄er strictly positive amounts of money, on average be-
tween 30 and 50% of the stake. O⁄ers of 50% are commonly observed. On
the other hand, o⁄ers exceeding 50% of the divided amount are extremely rare
and never rejected, while o⁄ers below 20% are rejected frequently, suggesting
that Proposers have to take into account the social concern of Responders, who
reject too low o⁄ers.
A variation of ultimatum game where Responder can only accept is called the
dictator game. In this case, there are no strategic consideration from the part of
Proposer. The experimental evidence on this game reports that dictator-game
Proposers (Dictators, hereafter) propose signi￿cantly less than ultimatum-game
Proposers and the average o⁄er is around 20% of the divided sum. O⁄ers of
50% of the stake are still frequently observed in this game (see Camerer (2003)).
The second game, public good game with punishment, is a n-person two-
stage game. The ￿rst stage coincides with standard public good game without
punishment. All players receive an endowment of y > 1 monetary units and
decide how much to contribute to public good and how much to leave for them-
selves. Each agent earns 1
n < a < 0 units of money from each unit contributed
to public good. In the second stage, which makes public good games with and
without punishment di⁄erent, each agent observes the vector of all contribu-
tions g = (g1;:::;gn) and decides whether and who she punishes. Each unit of
punishment costs c 2 (0;1). Let pij denote how much agent i punishes agent j.
The material payo⁄ of agent i, therefore, is:










Proposition 2 In public good game with punishment played by n sel￿sh players,
the unique equilibrium prediction is no contribution and no punishment.
5Using the assumption of self-interest, Public good game with and without
punishment coincide. However, in experiments, we observe completely di⁄erent
behavioral patterns. In last rounds of public good game without punishment,
experimental subjects￿behavior stabilizes close to full free-riding, as predicted
assuming self-interest, while the possibility to punish lead to high contribution
levels in public good game with punishment. Figure 1. shows the results of ex-
periment of Fehr and Gachter (2000). Observe the contrast between the public
good game with and without punishment. In the upper box, the punishment
options causes that more than 80% of individuals contribute fully to the public
poll, while around 80% of individuals are close to the Nash equilibrium pre-
diction when the punisment is not possible. The lower box provides similar
contrast for the stranger treatment, where players are rematched in each round.
Put Figure 1. around here
Concerning the second stage of the game, contrary to the prediction, people
do punish deviators. Generally, as the contribution of an individual decreases,
the more seriously and frequently is this player punished. Unambiguously, it is
the punishment what causes that, in experiments, we observe the convergence
to high contribution scenarios in this game.
3 Social preferences
3.1 Distributional Models
The models discussed in this section assume agents to have preferences over
the whole ￿nal allocation of material well-being. They di⁄er in the way social
concern enters into the utility function of an individual.
One of the most studied deviation from self-interest hypothesis is altruism.
The idea of altruism reaches the very beginning of economics thoughts. Smith
(1976) largely discusses altruism in his Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759.
Also, Beker (1974) provides an exploration of altruism. Formally, an individual




In words, an altruistic individual is positively concerned with the welfare of
others. The more others have, the happier he feels. Note that altruism, as
described in (1), does not require linearity. Kirchsteiger (1994) uses the opposite
idea, envy. An envious agent prefers the others to have a lower material payo⁄.
In this case, the utility function is decreasing in the payo⁄ of others.
An agent with egalitarian utility prefers allocations where each individual
derives the same utility. Suppose, for example, two agents, i and j. If one unit
of a good bears utility 3 to i and utility 1 to j, then, egalitarian agent i prefers
allocation of 1 unit for herself and 3 units to agent j, rather than allocation of 2
6units for each. Andreoni and Miller (2002) ￿nd an evidence for this utility type
in their experiment.
Charness and Rabin (2002) develop a multiperson model based on their
experimental observations and calibration. They propose the following utility
function:
Ui(￿1;:::;￿n) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿i + ￿[￿ minf￿1;:::;￿ng + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿1 + ::: + ￿n)]: (2)
with ￿ 2 [0;1] and ￿ 2 (0;1). Subjects tend to help the worst-o⁄ player and
maximize the social income. Both features form the other-regarding part of
the utility function. The value of ￿ determines the relative power of these two
concepts. Then, both other-regarding preferences and self-interest play a role.
The power of each is re￿ ected by parameter ￿. The higher ￿, the less important
is self-interest in the model and the higher is the impact of social concerns on
individual￿ s behavior. Extreme values, for instance, allow for pure a completely
sel￿sh player or a pure social maximizer.
The utility function (2) is based on two separated ideas: social-welfare max-
imization and maximin criterion.8
The ￿rst in proposing the concept of social-welfare maximization was Jeremy
Bentham. Therefore, this utility function is sometimes called Benthamian.
Social-welfare maximizer maximizes the social income. In mathematical ter-
minology, the social-welfare maximizer￿ s utility function is the weighted sum of
individual incomes. An evidence of existence of agents with this type of utility
function are Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Charness and Rabin (2002), them-
selves. Charness and Rabin￿ s model assumes equal weights for each player.9
The other concept is so-called maximin criterion, or Rawlsian justice, due
to John Rawls (1971). He argues that we reach a perfect justice by maximizing
the minimum income in the society that is, Ui(￿1;:::;￿n) = minj f￿jg.
We, now, provide the prediction of the model in the ultimatum game:
Proposition 3 Consider ultimatum game with Responder and Proposer having









if ￿P = 1
1+￿P . Responder never rejects.
Unless ￿P = 1
1+￿P , only very fair or very unfair o⁄ers are predicted and
Responders never reject. Both results are in contrast with intermediate val-
ues observed in experiments. In addition, observe that, since Responder never
rejects, the second stage is irrelevant and the predictions of ultimatum and
dictator games should coincide. We know that it is not the case in the lab.
This results show that main problem of Charness and Rabin￿ s model: the
absence of negative emotions. Similar feature arises in the next result:
8The utility function, which maximizes the social welfare is sometimes called utilitarian in
the literature.
9Observe that in (2), the weight of i￿ s own and the worst-o⁄ player￿ s payo⁄s are, in fact,
larger, due to the other parts of individual￿ s utility function.
7Proposition 4 In equilibrium of public good game with punishment played by








if ￿i < 1￿a
(n￿1)a(1￿￿i)+￿i
if ￿i > 1￿a
(n￿1)a(1￿￿i)




For , ￿i = 1￿a
(n￿1)a(1￿￿)+￿i, gi 2 [0;maxfg￿ig) and for ￿i = 1￿a
(n￿1)a(1￿￿i), gi 2
(maxfg￿ig;y]. Therefore, no contribution, full contribution, and k players play
gi = y and n ￿ k players play gi = 0 can be equilibrium outcomes.
Also in this case, the prediction of Charness and Rabin￿ s model is rejected by
observed behavior. Even if it allows for equilibria with high contribution levels,
it is independent of punishment. The experimental evidence on public good
game with and without punishment shows that punishment option is crucial to
induce high contribution levels.
The concept of inequity aversion, developed simultaneously by Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999), is based on relative income
hypothesis. Although all the models were published in last decade the idea that
people care about their position in society dates back to Veblen (1922).
Bolton and Ockenfels extend Bolton￿ s (1991) two-person model. Bolton






such that ui is strictly increasing in the ￿rst argument and weakly increasing
with respect to the second if ￿i < ￿j. For ￿i ￿ ￿j,
@ui(￿i;￿i=￿j)
@(￿i=￿j) = 0. In
words, an agent su⁄ers if he gets less, but in the other case, he becomes self-
interested. In dictator game, it predicts only zero-o⁄ers, but on the other hand,
low-ultimatum game o⁄ers can be rejected. Nevertheless, (3) is not applicable
when more than two players are involved. Therefore, Bolton and Ockenfels
propose the following form:








j ￿j > 0
1=n if
P
j ￿j = 0
(4)
with ui weakly increasing and concave in material well-being of player i, ￿i.
The conditions with respect to the second argument are: (a) strict concavity
of (4) in $i for
P
j ￿j > 0; and (b) for a ￿xed material payo⁄, (4) achieves its
unique maximum when agent i￿ s material payo⁄ equals the average share, i.e.
￿i=
P
j ￿j = 1=n. The fact that this is independent of the distribution among
i￿ s opponents is crucial when comparing this model to Fehr and Schmidt, below.
Bolton and Ockenfels de￿ne two threshold shares, ri and si, that are cru-
cial in predicting behavior using their model. The former denotes the share
that maximizes agent i￿ s utility. It re￿ ects how much the agent is willing
8to deviate upwards (to increase her share and, consequently, material pay-
o⁄) from the equitable share to maximize her utility. In two-player case,
it is represented by the o⁄er Proposer makes in dictator game. Formally,
ri(
P





The latter threshold is the lowest share a player still prefers rather than zero
for everybody. It, for instance, determines the Responder￿ s rejection threshold
in Ultimatum game. In mathematical formulation, si(
P
j ￿j) is de￿ned such
that ui(si
P
j ￿j;si) = ui(0;1=n).









, and the strict concavity of
(4) with respect to $i ensures both their existence and unicity.
First, we derive the prediction of this model in the ultimatum game:10
Proposition 5 Consider an ultimatum game with Responder and Proposer
having the utility function (4). In the unique equilibrium, Proposer o⁄ers
maxfsR(:);1 ￿ rP(:)g
and Responder accepts this o⁄er.
As shown above, Bolton and Ockenfels￿ s model explains positive o⁄ers in dic-
tator and ultimatum games. If 1￿rP(:) < sR(:), dictator-games o⁄er are lower
than in case of ultimatum games. Therefore, if most of people in ultimatum-
game experiments satisfy this relation, we would, actually, observe that Dicta-
tors o⁄er less than Proposers. Furthermore, agents highly concerned with the
share can o⁄er the same in both games. Indeed, in experiments, there are sub-
jects who o⁄ers half the share in Dictator game, even if Responder cannot do
anything but accept.
Let us proceed to a characterization of the optimal behavior in the second
game:
Proposition 6 Consider the public good game with punishment, played by n
players, who have the utility function (4). Then:
1. No contribution and no punishment is an equilibrium.
2. If there is at least an i such that ri > 1
n and c ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿1, no common
contribution scenario such that gi = g 2 (0;y] is an equilibrium.
The speci￿cation of Bolton and Ockenfels￿ s utility function and the fact that
if a player punishes she does not mind who she punishes causes that we cannot
provide more speci￿c result than Proposition 2. Nevertheless, few conclusions
can be made. First, the proof shows that a player can be punished due to
a misbehavior of other players. This is clearly inconsistent with experimental
evidence. Second, as Proposition 2 shows that, even with low c (relative to n),
only zero contribution are made in equilibrium. However, many experimental
10The following proposition and its proof is a simpli￿cation of the discussion of equilibrium
behavior in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
9studies use c >(n￿1)￿1 and still observe high contributions (Carpenter (2007),
Fehr and Gachter (2000), Isaac and Walker (1988)), violating the prediciton of
Bolton and Ockenfels￿ s model.
We cannot prove that high cannot be sustained in equilibrium, but the fact
that people compare themselves with the average, rather the deviators, and, con-
sequently, any punisher may punish any other player with positive probability,
suggests that it will be di¢ cult have a positive contributions in an equilibrium.
Fehr and Schmidt o⁄er a di⁄erent model of the same idea. Their individuals
are concerned about the payo⁄s of others, relative to their own material well-
being. Fehr and Schmidt￿ s type of inequity aversion is self-centered, in the
sense that the reference point each individual compares with is her own material
payo⁄.11 Formally,












with 0 ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿i and ￿i ￿ 1. In (5), agents￿utility function has three com-
ponents: agents derive utility from their own material payo⁄s, they feel envy
toward agents who get more than they do, and feel guilt towards those who
are worst o⁄. The condition ￿i ￿ ￿i re￿ ects that being better o⁄ creates less
disutility than being worse o⁄. Note that there is no upper limit for ￿i what
practically allows any level of envy. This model goes along the lines of exper-
imental ￿ndings of Loewenstein et al. (1989) who discover that their subjects
have non-linear utility functions, similar to that proposed by Fehr and Schmidt.
Let us state the prediction of Fehr and Schmidt￿ s model in the Ultimatum
game:
Proposition 7 Consider an ultimatum game played by players with Fehr and
Schmidt￿ s utilities. It is a dominant strategy for a Responder to accept any c ￿ 1
2
and to reject if c < ￿R
1+2￿R < 1














if ￿P > 1
2
if ￿P = 1
2
if ￿P < 1
2
:
Proof. See Fehr and Schmidt [21], Proposition 1.
Proposition 7 shows that Fehr and Schmidt￿ s model can explain positive
o⁄ers and rejection of low o⁄ers in ultimatum game. However, note that all
o⁄ers between zero and one half are positive only due to Responder￿ s threat
of rejection. Thus, in Dictator game, we should only observe o⁄ers of either
zero or one half. This goes against the evidence, because a signi￿cant fraction
of subjects gives less than in ultimatun games, being the gift still positive.
11Fehr and Schmidt argue that inequity aversion should be based on a neutral reference
point that allows to perceive (un)fairness. Since the reference point in their model is agent￿ s
own payo⁄, they prefer to use the term self-centered inequity aversion.
10Nevertheless, this problematic feature of Fehr and Schmidt can be solved by a
slight two-player variation of (5):
Ui(￿i;￿j) = ￿i ￿
X
j6=i
[￿i maxf0;￿j ￿ ￿ig + ￿i maxf0;￿i ￿ ￿jg]
2 . (6)
Proposition 8 Let players have the utility function (6). Then:
1. If Dictator￿ s guilt parameter is high enough, she can o⁄er positive amounts











2. In ultimatum game, Responder accepts any c ￿ 1
2. In equilibrium, Pro-


















der accepts this o⁄er.
Put Figure 2. around here
Figure 2 shows how much Dictator keeps for herself in dictator game as a
function of Dictator￿ s parameter of inequity aversion ￿. This non-linear version
of (5) can explain positive giving in dictator game if the Dictator is concerned
enough with inequity aversion. In particular, if ￿D > 1
2 Dictator does not keep
for herself the whole amount. For high values of ￿D she can o⁄er the opponent
until 40% of the stake divided. Furthermore, if Proposer is non-sel￿sh enough,
she can o⁄er high shares in both ultimatum and dictator games, as actually
observed in experiments. The behavior of Responders has very similar features
under both linear and non-linear speci￿cations, even if the rejection level is
slightly lower in the non-linear speci￿cation. Thus, the proposed non-linear
model provides good predictions in both games.
Before we state the equilibrium prediction of Fehr and Schmidt￿ s model in
the public good game with punishment, we have to introduce a concept of a con-
ditionally cooperative enforcer. Fehr and Schmidt de￿ne a conditionally coop-
erative enforcer as an individual, who "is su⁄cientely concerned about inequity
(p.841)". The following proposition contains the formal de￿nition.
Proposition 9 Suppose there is a group of n0 2 [1;n] conditionally cooperative
enforcers with preferences (5) obeying a + ￿i ￿ 1 and
c <
￿i
(n ￿ 1)(1 + ￿i) ￿ (n0 ￿ 1)(￿i + ￿i)
for all i 2 f1;:::;n0g, whereas all other players do not care about inequality.
Then, the subgame perfect equilibrium is:
￿ In the ￿rst stage each player contributes gi = g 2 [0;y]
11￿ If each player does so, there is no punishment. If a non-enforcer deviate
downwards, each enforcer chooses pji = (g ￿gi)=(n0 ￿c), while any of the
other players do not punish.
Proof. See Fehr and Schmidt [21], Proposition 4.
Although Proposition 9 also provides a condition when high level of coop-
eration can be sustained in equilibrium, low contribution equilibria are equally
likely. Fehr and Schmidt argue that full contribution is a natural focal point,
but, using the same argument, no contribution can be considered a natural focal
point as well. Hence, neither Fehr and Schmidt nor Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
provide any particularly strong argument why mostly high contribution levels
are observed in experiments with punishment option.
Even if Fehr and Schmidt do not allow for all values of model parameter,
disregarding their constraints brings on di⁄erent versions of their model which
can provide interesting cases. For example, if ￿i < 0 < ￿i the individual utility
can be written as







what is known in the literature as status-seeking. Depending on the relation of
j￿ij and j￿ij, the individual can treat worse those that are better o⁄. Another
case is to simply allow for ￿i < 0 < j￿ij < ￿i ￿ 1
2. In such a case, agent is a
social-welfare maximizer with weights on her and her opponents￿payo⁄s being
(1 ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿i) and
(￿i+￿i)
n￿1 , respectively.12
Let us, now, discuss the di⁄erence between Fehr and Schmidt￿ s and Bolton
and Ockenfels￿ s model in more detail. For two-player games, both Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) obtain similar predictions. The
two-player version of (5) is:
U1(￿1;￿2) = ￿1 ￿ ￿1 maxf0;￿2 ￿ ￿1g ￿ ￿2 maxf0;￿1 ￿ ￿2g: (7)
Note that (7) is two-piece-wise linear. Since it increases for ￿2 > ￿1 and
decreases otherwise, it is concave in 1￿ s material payo⁄. For a ￿xed material
payo⁄, the maximum with respect to opponent￿ s payo⁄ is achieved if 1￿ s share
is 1=n = 1=2. Moreover, (7) is strictly increasing in 1￿ s payo⁄, for a given payo⁄
di⁄erence. Similarly to (4), the utility function can only be decreasing in her
own payo⁄ if her payo⁄ advantage is too large.
The crucial di⁄erence is that the role of share is in (7) replaced by payo⁄
di⁄erence. Another di⁄erence between the two models is the functional form
with respect to inequity part. Recall that Bolton and Ockenfels assume a strict
concavity what allows for a unique si(:) and ri(:), while this is not, in general,
the case in Fehr and Schmidt￿ s speci￿cation, since the relation is linear and,
therefore, not strictly concave.
12It is important to remark that predictions of Fehr and Schmidt￿ s model and, in particular,
Propositions 7 and 9 might change dramatically under these di⁄erent speci￿cations.
12The contrast arises in multiperson games. In Fehr and Schmidt, each player
compares herself with each player separately, while, in Bolton and Ockenfels,
she compares herself with the average. In this latter case, whether @￿jUi is
positive or negative does not depend on whether j is worse or better o⁄ than i,
but exclusively on i￿ s position in comparison with the average, i.e. if ￿i is below
the average she can even lower payo⁄s of worse-o⁄ opponents. This feature is
the crucial di⁄erence between the 2 models.
Let us illustrate the di⁄erence on a simple example. Consider, ￿rst, an agent
i who has to choose a division of 6 monetary units among three agents. The three
options are (2,2,2), (2,1,3), and (2,0,4), such that the ￿rst element is for agent i
and the second and third for other players. A Bolton and Ockenfels￿ s individual
is completely indi⁄erent which one to choose, while Fehr and Schmidt￿ s agent
prefers (2,2,2) to any other and (2,1,3) to (2,0,4).
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) provide a direct experimental comparison
of both versions of inequity aversion. Their results argue in favor of Fehr and
Schmidt￿ s formalization. This setting performs better in their experiment. How-
ever, the general performance of inequity-aversion models in their experiment
is very poor in comparison with other preference types.
Moreover, as argued by Charness and Rabin (2002), the complete anonymity
among experimental subjects in experimental lab makes the interpersonal com-
parison based exclusively on material gains from the play. Hence, since this
prevents subjects to take into the account other aspects (such as deserveness,
sympathy etc.), this feature of experiments makes payo⁄s and, consequently,
payo⁄ di⁄erences salient. The role of inequity aversion can, then, be exagger-
ated in experiments.
The above argumets suggest that something is missing in the model of this
section. Hence, we proceed, in the next chapter, with the role of intentions.
3.2 Reciprocity
In this subsection, we try to review literature where people are concerned with
the behavior of others and, as a response to this behavior, apply their emotions
in the decision process. There are observations that the same people are kind
in some situations or toward some individuals, and spiteful in other situations
or toward other people. In our case, we focus on the notion of reciprocity. The
literature distinguishes two types of reciprocity, negative and positive. Negative
reciprocity is the tendency to punish unfair or unkind behavior. Ultimatum
game and public good game with punishment are two typical games where neg-
ative reciprocity is observed. In ultimatum game, Responders can punish unfair
o⁄ers by rejecting them. In public good game with punishment, people observe
the contributions made by others and eventually punish them for their behav-
ior. As mentioned in Section 2 above, a self-interested agent neither reject nor
punish and the evidence contradicts this prediction. Blount (1995) directly tests
the hypothesis that people reject in ultimatum game because they ￿nd the o⁄ers
mean. She runs an ultimatum game experiment where the o⁄ers are generated
by a computer and Responders know it. The potential di⁄erence between ulti-
13matum game and this setting can point out the role of reciprocity in rejection
behavior. Actually, even low o⁄ers are rarely rejected. The experimental stud-
ies show that the punished subjects are those with the lowest contribution in
Public good game with punishment.
Experimental examples of positive reciprocity are gift-exchange and trust
game. In the gift exchange game, an Employer o⁄ers a wage to a Worker
who, consequently, exhibits e⁄ort. Given that Employer cannot condition the
wage on e⁄ort it is optimal for a sel￿sh agent to make the lowest possible
e⁄ort, independently of the o⁄ered wage. In the trust game, Investor can invest
an amount by giving it to Receiver. The invested amount is multiplied by
three, and Receiver have to decide how much he returns to Investor. Fehr
et al. (1997), for instance, experimentally test gift exchange game in labor
market framework. They ￿nd a positive relation between the salary o⁄ered and
￿ returned￿e⁄ort. The higher o⁄er the employer makes (the better the employer
treats), the more e⁄ort the worker performs (the more the worker repays to the
employer). Similarly, in case of trust game, Berg et al. (1995) ￿nd positive
correlation between the money sent by the Investor and the amount returned
by the Receiver.13
The models discussed in this section use psychological game theory, proposed
by Geanakoplos et al. (1989), and later generalized by Battigalli and Dufwen-
berg (2005). Psychological game theory introduces personal beliefs into the
analysis what, as explained below, allows for direct modeling and evaluation of
intentions.
The ￿rst attempt to directly model reciprocity is Rabin (1993). His model is
built on three stylized facts: people helps those who are being kind with them
(positive reciprocity), punish those who are treating them meanly (negative
reciprocity) and, as the material stakes rise, the above e⁄ects become weaker.
He follows Geanakoplos et al. (1989) by allowing payo⁄s to depend on their
actions and beliefs, simultaneously. He argues that ￿rst and second-order beliefs
are su¢ cient to model intentions and suggests methodology how to deal with
two-players normal-form games. Rabin simpli￿es the analysis of psychological
game theory by assuming that ￿i 2 ￿i, ￿0
ji 2 ￿i and ￿00
iji 2 ￿i, such that ￿i
denotes strategy chosen by player i, ￿0
ji player j￿ s beliefs about the action of
player i; and ￿00
iji player i￿ s belief about what player j beliefs i plays.14
We proceed directly to the discussion of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004),
who provide a generalization of Rabin￿ s model for N-persons extensive-form
games. Let H be the set of histories leading to subgames, and Ai the set
of behavior strategies of i. Then, ai(h) is a behavioral strategy of player i;
13See Section 1 of Rabin (1993) for a more exhaustive discussion of evidence on both neg-
ative and positive reciprocity from psychology and economics. Camerer (2003) surveys the
experimental evidence on the issue of reciprocity.
14In psychological game theory, ￿rst-order belief is a probability measure over the space
of other players￿mixed strategies. So, the set of ￿rst order beliefs is: S0
i :=M (￿￿i): The
set of second-order beliefs is de￿ned as S00
i :=M (￿￿i ￿ S0
i). Hence, Rabin (1993) simpli￿es
considerablly the analysis by de￿ning that S0
i ￿ ￿j and so on. The term belief is also used
in games with incomplete information and is used to denote the probability of being in a
particular node x in an information set (see, for example, Vega Redondo (2003), p.118).
14for a given history. The de￿nition of behavioral strategy di⁄ers from standard
game theory though. In standard game-theoretical approach, it is completely
irrelevant for the decision in a particular node what happened in the past or
which path lead into the node. The only relevant information for the decision
in that node is the information conveyed by the ￿nal nodes that follow it. This
di⁄ers in psychological game theory, where beliefs enter the utility function.
Thus, what happens with the beliefs about the play preceding a node is as
relevant as what happens as the game unravels afterwards. To deal with this
problem, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger suggest that beliefs up-date correctly;
that is, the actions taken in the past are believed to be played with probability
1. This feature of their model causes that what had been predicted to be done
in a particular node may change once this node has been reached; something
that cannot happen in standard game theory.
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i(h);(aj(h))j6=i) ￿ ￿k(ai(h);(aj(h))j6=i);





Intuitively, a strategy is ine¢ cient if there exists another strategy which, con-
ditional on any history of play and subsequent choices by the others, provides
no lower material payo⁄ for any player, and a higher material payo⁄ for some
player for some history of play and subsequent choices by the others (Dufwen-
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beliefs about what strategies her opponents are playing. An agent deduces a





[maxf￿j(ai;(bij)j6=i) j ai 2 Aig + minf￿j(ai;(bij)j6=i) j ai 2 Eig]:
Thus, the reference point is the average of the highest feasible payo⁄ and the
lowest e¢ cient payo⁄, given beliefs. De￿ne the kindness of player i toward j, at
history h, as a function ￿ij : Ai ￿
Y
j6=i Bij ￿! R:
￿ij(ai(h);(bij(h))j6=i) = ￿j(ai(h);(bij(h))j6=i) ￿ ￿ei
j ((bij(h))j6=i):
In words, the kindness of agent i toward j is proportional to the kindness ex-
pected from j. The sign is determined by the comparison of the actual payo⁄
of player j with the above reference point.
Analogously, the second-order beliefs, (cijk)k6=j;j6=i, re￿ ect i￿ s beliefs about
what j thinks that k plays. Observe that i = k is allowed what states for
i￿ s beliefs about j￿ s beliefs about what i herself will do. Then, ￿iji : Bij ￿ Y
k6=j
Cijk ￿! R such that
￿iji(bij(h);(ciji(h))k6=j) = ￿i(bij(h);(ciji(h))k6=j) ￿ ￿ei
i ((ciji(h))k6=j)
15measures how i believes treated by j.













where Yij is an exogenously given non-negative number for each j 6= i; measuring
how sensitive is i regarding player j.
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger￿ s model introduces the idea of conditional co-
operation. In sequential games, people can decide whether to treat kindly or
meanly on basis of past actions of their opponents. Conditional cooperation
is commonly observed in experiments. Experimental evidence on public good
game without punishment option suggests that conditional cooperation can be
a possible explanation of gradual decreasing of contributions over time.15
Since the above model is very di⁄erent from the preceding, Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger de￿ne a concept of sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE, p. 278).
First, for a given ai(h) 2 Ai and h, let Ai(h;a) be the set of strategies i may
use if she behaves according to the behavioral strategy ai(h) in all h0 6= h, but
is free to use any strategy at h. With this notation at hand, the equlilibrium
concept can be stated as follows:
De￿nition 10 The pro￿le a￿ = (a￿
i)i2N is a SRE if for all i 2 N and for each
history h 2 H, it holds that:
(a) a￿
i(h) 2 arg max
ai2Ai(h;a￿)
Ui(ai;(bij(h);(cijk(h))k6=j)j6=i),
(b) bij = a￿
j for al j 6= i,
(c) cijk = a￿
k for all j 6= i;k 6= j.
The ￿rst part of the de￿nition is parallel to the standard equilibrium con-
cepts: all players play the best response to strategies of all the other players.
The part (b) and (c) requires the beliefs to match in equilibrium. Thus, in
equilibrium, beliefs have to be consistent with the actual play in the game.
The de￿nition allows us to state the predictions of Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger￿ s model in the ultimatum game:16
Proposition 11 In a SRE of Ultimatum game played by Proposer and Respon-
der with utility functions (8), Responders:
15See Fischbacher et al. (2001) for a direct test of this hypothesis.
16Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) sketch an informal proof of their prediction in a
slightly di⁄erent ultimatum game in the working paper version. Here, we provide the formal
proof for our speci￿cation of the game in Appendix A.
16￿ accept any c > YR
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There exist equilibria, where Proposers o⁄er the lowest acceptable o⁄er. For
for YP high enough and YR > 0 , there exist equilibria, in which the o⁄er is
rejected.
As shown in Proposition 11, very high and very low o⁄ers, respectively, are
accepted and rejected with probability 1, and there is a range of values, for
which any strategy of Responder is optimal. This is due to the belief consis-
tency condition in De￿nition 10. These o⁄ers are characterized by self-ful￿lling
prophecies: if negative beliefs prevail, o⁄ers from this range will be rejected,
while positive beliefs may lead to the acceptance of the same o⁄er.
Concerning the behavior of Proposer, since Responder can never be nice to
Proposer,17 the latter maximizes his utility, o⁄ering the lowest acceptable o⁄er.
On the other hand, if Proposer￿ s psychological part of the utility is important
enough to overweight her sel￿shness, she may prefer zero for the Responder,
if she expects rejection, and state a low enough o⁄er, which would be rejected
with probablity 1. Such o⁄er exists for any YR > 0.
Observe that this model o⁄er no insight into the dictator-game evidence.
Since the Responder can be neither kind nor mean in this game, Proposer simply
maximizes her material payo⁄. Thus, the unique prediction of this model would
be c = 0, re￿ ecting the problematic feature of pure intentionalist models.
We proceed with the public good game with the punishment option:
Proposition 12 In SRE of the public good game with punishment played by
players having utility function (8):
1. Agent who contributes equal or more than
y
2 and does not punish is never
punished.








a2y , gi = y and no punishment for each i is an
equilibrium.




for each i 2 N can be
an equilibrium, unless for all i 2 N,
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5. A common contribution such that gi = g 2 (0;
y
2] for each i 2 N cannot be
an equilibrium.
17Note that rejection is completely ine¢ cient. This implies that the equitable payo⁄ of
Proposer is 1 ￿ c. Hence, Responder can only be neutral accepting or mean rejecting.
176. No contribution without punishment can be an equilibrium if each i has
Yij low enough for each opponent j.
The predictions of this model in public good game with punishment contrast
with the observations in the laboratory. Experimental subjects, who deviate
downwards from a common contribution, use to be punished independently of
the level of common contribution that is, even if they still contribute more than
y
2. The second part predicts that the less j contributes, the more seriously she
is punished by others, in harmony with observations. The third part shows
that if everybody is enough concerned with reciprocity, full contribution is an
equilibrium. However, the cooperative equilibrium is sustained by high social
concern, rather than the threat of being punished, as observed in the lab. Note
that, since this prediction is independent of the punishment stage, it extends
into the public good game without the punishment option. This illustrates even
better why the prediction of this model regarding the cooperative outcome does
not match the stylized facts. Moreover, since too small deviations are not worth
of punishment, only the sel￿sh part of deviator￿ s utility is a⁄ected by this
small deviation, which increases. Therefore, common contribution scenarios are
mostly not sustained in equilibrium.
To summarize, the predictions of Rabin￿ s and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger￿ s
model are in some sense in contrast with the experimental evidence. The main
reason is that they deal with pure intentions. In the next section, we discuss
models that combine distributional and intention-based models.
3.3 Combinations
In Falk et al. (2003), subjects play four mini-ultimatum games from Figure 3.
In all games, Proposer chooses which option to o⁄er to Responder who either
accepts and the proposed distribution realizes, or rejects and both get nothing.
Falk et al. concentrates on rejections of the (8,2) o⁄er, which appears in all
games and allocates 8 monetary units to Proposer and 2 units to Responder.
Let us call each game according to the alternative distribution. There are two
possible hypothesis. First, purely distributional models predict that the rejec-
tion rates of (8,2) o⁄er do not change across the four games, because the payo⁄
consequences are always the same. In particular, acceptance leads to distribu-
tion of (8,2) and rejection to (0,0) in all four left-hand parts of the four games.
Distributional models, in other words, predict that the unchosen alternatives
play no role. Intentionalist models, on the other hand, suggest decreasing rejec-
tion rates of this order: the highest rejection of (8,2) distribution in 5/5 game,
following with 2/8 game, 8/2 and the lowest in 10/0 game.18 Since Proposer is
forced to o⁄er (8,2) distribution in 8/2 game, the rejection rate measures pure
distributional motives. Figure 4. plots the rejection rates of the (8,2) o⁄ers of
18Choosing (8,2) over (5,5) in 5/5 game shows Proposer￿ s bad intentions, since a reasonable,
completely equitable allocation exists. In 2/8, a big sacri￿ce has to be made to o⁄er Responder
better alternative. In 8/2 game, intentions play no role and in 10/0, (8,2) distribution signals
good intentions.
18the four games. The ranking of rejection rates is exactly as intention-based mod-
els predict. Moreover, observe that there is a almost 20% of subjects rejecting
the (8,2) allocation, even in the absence of any intention, and around 10% still
rejecting (8,2) allocation, even in the presence of only good intentions, bene￿t-
ing so the arguments of distributional models. This intelligent test shows that
the combination of both distributional and intention-based models is necessary
to explain experimental evidence. This chapter reviews models that attempt to
combine both types of concepts.
Put Figure 3. around here.
Put Figure 4. around here.
Levine (1998) proposes the following utility function:19






where ￿ 2 [0;1] and for all i 2 N, ai 2 (￿1;1), is the altruism parameter of
player i. Observe that the utility function depends on the opponents￿altruism.
Referring to ￿, two cases can occur: ￿ = 0 and ￿ > 0. In the ￿rst case, i￿ s
utility reduces to Ui = ￿i + ai
P
j6=i ￿j. Then, if ai > 0 (ai < 0) agent i is
altruist (spiteful) and we have a purely distributional model. This case cannot
explain while a person behaves altruistically in some situations and spitefully
in others. The other case is ￿ > 0. If such, i behaves more altruistically toward
altruistic players and viceversa. Moreover, if 0 ￿ ai < ￿￿aj an altruistic player
can behave spitefully. This logic is parallel to modelling reciprocity.
Levine di⁄ers in a an important way from the rest of models discussed in
this survey. Since Levine￿ s individual utility function depends on the coe¢ cient
of altruism of opponents which, in practice, characterizes j￿ s utilities, the utility
of agents depend on opponents utilities, rather than payo⁄s or actions. This
approach is broader that simple payo⁄ interdependence. It seems reasonable to
believe that individuals treats better good people and meanly mean ones. The
problem of this model is that the parameters of other agents￿utilities are not
observable. They are deduced from actions of others what, on the other hand,
serves as an argument in favor of models of the previous and this section, which
model the perception of intentions using payo⁄s and actions. Levine is aware
of that and argues that players may reveal information about their altruism
coe¢ cient through their play (p.598).
Let us illustrate the properties of this model on ultimatum game predictions:
19Sethi and Somanathan (2003) argue that Levine￿ s (1998) speci￿cation of preferences does
not survive the evolutionary arguments and propose an alternative
Ui = xi +
X
j6=i
xj(ai + ￿(ai ￿ aj))
1 + ￿
:
Such a utility function does not have the evolutionary problems of Levine (1998).
19Proposition 13 Consider ultimatum-game Proposer and Responder with util-









if aR + ￿RaP ￿ 0 and aP < 1 and/or aR < 1
if aR + ￿RaP < 0 and aP < 1 and/or aR < 1
if aP = aR = 1
and Responder accepts.
The ￿rst case shows the weakness of this model. In this case, both Proposer
and Responder are positively concerned with each other￿ s payo⁄, but this feature
allows Proposer to o⁄er nothing. In experiments, however, o⁄ering nothing is
considered unfair and widely rejected. This re￿ ects why it is important to get
rid of this type of equilibria and the existence of such equilibria is a drawback
of Levine￿ s model. The second case - aR + ￿RaP < 0 - seems to match the
best the experimental evidence: it predicts a positive o⁄ers depending on the
altruism of the Responder. Hence, the signaling of types through past play is
very relevant in this model. Levine calibrates the possible types of opponents
using a particular distribution of types, but does not provide any particular
way, how to deduct the altruism parameters of opponents from the past play.
The prediction for the public good game with punishment leads to a similar
problem:
Proposition 14 In equilibrium of public good game with punishment played by
players with utility (9):
1. Second-stage punishment is completely independent of contributions made
in the ￿rst stage of the game and agent i punishes only agents j with the
altruism parameter low enough.





a ￿ (n ￿ 1)ai
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￿i, all players contribute
fully.














a ￿ (n ￿ 1)ai
i
1
￿i, any gi 2 [0;y] is
equilibrium.
5. There can be equilibria with some players contributing fully, some con-
tributing nothing and some contributing any gi 2 [0;y].
Again, similar problems as in ultimatum game appear here. The punishment
stage is completely independent on contribution in stage 1, in contrast with
laboratory experiment where the ￿rst stare contributions signal the altruism of
players.
Charness and Rabin (2002), apart from the reciprocity-free version from Sec-
tion 3.1, propose a model that combines intentions and distribution of payo⁄s.
20Since Charness and Rabin observe no positive reciprocity in their experiment,
they develop a model capturing what they call concern withdrawal20 and com-
bine it with the purely distributional model. Charness and Rabin extend their
preferences with a demerit pro￿le, d = (d1;:::;dn) such that di 2 [0;1], measur-
ing how much a player deserves from the point of view of other players. The
smaller is di the more the others concern i￿ s payo⁄. Charness and Rabin de￿ne
a utility function:
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where b;k and f are non-negative model parameters.
The utility function (10) shares purely distributional features of (2) combined
with that the less i believes j deserves, the less he is concerned about j￿ s payo⁄.
If b = k = f = 0 (10) coincides with (2). With f large, i even wants to hurt
players with high demerit parameter.
Even if Charness and Rabin do not count for positive reciprocity, allowing d
to lay between ￿1 and 1 can capture cases where agents reward kind behavior
with kind actions.21
Whether a player has misbehaved is determined on basis of a certain para-
meter ￿
￿ such that if a player has ￿ < ￿
￿ he invokes a negative reaction from his
opponents. This manner of modelling reciprocity is parallel to Levine (1998).
In both cases, reciprocity lies upon the observebility of individual preferences
and in both models, reciprocity works as a reinforcement device for purely dis-
tributional models. The problem is that neither Charness and Rabin (2002) nor
Levine (1998) o⁄er a formal de￿nition of reciprocity, contrary to Rabin (1993)
and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), what reduces the generality of the
model. Nevertheless, we can combine Levine (1998) and Charness and Rabin
(2002) with the de￿nition in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).22 Suppose,
for instance, ￿ = ￿(c) in Ultimatum game with ￿
0(c) > 0 and ￿(1
2) = 0. In such
a case, high (low) c reinforces (lowers) kindness of Responder toward Proposer.23
Charness and Rabin￿ s (2002) speci￿cation provides interesting insights, but
there are too many free parameters in their model. This makes the model
practically impossible to test in the laboratory.
A very sophisticated model of combination of distributional and intention-
based model is Falk and Fischbacher (2004). They integrate the ideas of reci-
procity and inequity aversion into one model, using the framework of psycholog-
20Charness and Rabin (2002) de￿ne concern withdrawal as a situation, in which people
￿withdraw their willingness to sacri￿ce to allocate the fair share toward somebody who himself
is unwilling to sacri￿ce for the sake of fairness￿(p. 820).
21An alternative approach would be not to restrict parameters b;k and f to be non-negative.
In such a case, dj would take value asigning the level of reciprocity j deserves and the sign of
individual parameters would determine whether the reciprocity is positive or negative.
22Falk and Fischbacher (2004), below, o⁄ers a di⁄erent de￿nition of reciprocal behavior,
which can also be applied here.
23In public good game with punishment, the solution would be ￿ = ￿ij(gj).
21ical game theory. Qualitatively, Falk and Fischbacher provide similar insights
as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Nevertheless, Falk and Fischbacher
rede￿ne the reference standard upon which agents base their perception of
(un)kindness. They base it on the idea of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) and propose equity-based self-centered reference point for this evaluation.
Due to the extreme complexity of the model, we relegate the technical details
of this model into Appendix B and, in the main text, we only illustrate the logic
of their model, using examples.
In this model, when an individual earns less than another person, he feels
treated unkindly. Consider game 10/0 in Figure 3. It is reasonable suppose
that if Proposer behaves kindly and chooses the (8,2)-sideshoot, any responder
will accept this o⁄er. In contrast, this model predicts that any disadvantageous
distribution of payo⁄s is considered as undesirable. Nevertheless, the probability
to reject (8,2) distribution should be lower that in case of 5/5 or 2/8 game. The
experimental observation of Falk et al. (2003) shows that 10% of subjects, in
fact, reject and that this fraction is lower that in the other cases. This empirical
￿nding goes hand in hand with this model: People exhibit some inequity aversion
even when treated as kindly as possible.
As a next step, we state the predictions of the model in both ultimatum
game and public good game with punishment:24
Proposition 15 The unique reciprocity equilibrium of the ultimatum game played
by players with utility function (14) is:








if c < 0:5
if c ￿ 0:5 :











Proof. See Falk and Fischbacher [15], Proposition 1.
In harmony with experimental evidence, more than half amount is never
rejected and very low o⁄er are rejected with very high probability. Moreover, the








￿P ) the Responder￿ s social concerns are crucial and in this case, the
Dictator￿ s o⁄er is lower than in ultimatum game. On the other case, Proposers
with higher regards may o⁄er the same in ultimatum and dictator game. Thus,
this model reproduces all the stylized facts of these 2 games.
Proposition 16 In the equilibrium of Public good game with punishment played
by n players with utility function (14):
1. i never punishes j whose gj ￿ gi and pji = 0.
24Falk and Fischbacher (2004) de￿ne the reciprocity equilibrium as the analogue of the
sequential reciprocity equilibrium of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
222. If player i punishes, her optimal punishment is pij = pji + (1 ￿ c)￿1[gi ￿
gj ￿ c
￿i#(:)].
3. Any common contribution, such that gi = g 2 (0;y], is not equilibrium.
4. No contribution is an equilibrium.
The ￿rst two parts of Proposition 4 show the conditions for punishing and
the optimal punishment level. The lower is the contribution of an opponent the
more i punishes her. It is consistent with experimental results. The weakness
of this model is that it cannot sustain high contribution levels in equilibrium,
in spite of that they are widely observed in experiments. As in the model of
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), the reason is that any player can deviate
such a small amount downwards that her payo⁄ advantage is not worth being
punished. Despite the common features of this model and Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), the type of equilibria from Proposition 9 does not survive here using the
same argument.
4 Discussion
This paper surveys the models of social preferences. As shown, no existing
model can explain all the observational regularities in the two games we analyze.
Consequently, even though it is clear that a theory combining the properties of
distributional and intention-based models is required, the analysis of this paper
suggests that the existing literaure should serve as a cornerstone for further
empirical and theoretical modeling of human prosocial behavior.
It is worth mentioning that the aim of this survey is not to say that sel￿sh
behavior does not matter. On the contrary, Andreoni and Miller (2002), for
instance, report that almost 23% of their subjects behave as completely self-
interested; too signi￿cant fraction to simply reject the self-interest hypotheses.
On the other hand, more than 77% of subjects seem to maximize di⁄erent util-
ities. This fraction is also high enough in order not to stuck in simple payo⁄
maximization, as applied economic theory standartly assumes. Hence, any suf-
fciently realistic model should contain the self-interested individual among its
particular cases. This actually occurs in case of all the models discussed in this
paper.
One direction of research reports that the population is rather a mixture of
preference types. Most of the results here allows for heteregneity with respect
to the parameters of the models and, since self-interest is always a special case,
it allows for the coexistence of sel￿sh and prosocial individuals. Nevertheless,
we do not analyze the consequences of a richer coexistence of behavioral types.
Therefore, one path for research could be enriching economics and game theory
by models with a more complex strucutre of population. This approach could
lead to exploration of other empirical ￿ndings that cannot be explained by
today￿ s models.
23In this respect, as well as reciprocity, heterogeneous population can also pre-
dict why the same people can in one situation behave as sel￿sh and in another
one as altruists. The behavior should clearly di⁄er if treating with completely
sel￿sh individual from the treatment with an altruist. Since we suppose peo-
ple to play Nash equilibria, the extended utility functions can predict that an
optimal behavior di⁄er, depending on the opponent an individual faces. It is,
for instance, known that the presence of very few sel￿sh agents drives markets
toward very ￿unfair￿competitive outcomes in market-like experiments.
Other direction of research is to develop a theoretical model general enough
to encompasses great part of the existing models of social preferences. A big
step in this direction is Segal and Sobel (2007), who provide a set of axioms that
generate the type of models discussed in this survey. Even though they discuss
the connection of their model with psychological game theory, a formal merge
of the ideas of both approaches could provide a su¢ ciently general setup, con-
taining both Segal and Sobel￿ s utility functions and psychological game theory
as special cases.
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275 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. In the second stage, self-interested Responder
derives utility UR(c;A) = c if she accepts and UR(c;R) = 0, otherwise. Then
UR(c;A) ￿ UR(c;R) for any c ￿ 0 and she always accepts. Proposer knows it
and o⁄ers the smallest c, that is zero.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since @￿i
@pij = ￿c 8i;j 2 N, pij = 0 8i;j 2 N. In
the ￿rst stage, players anticipate this. Then, given that @￿i
@gi = ￿1 + a < 0 8i
and having a < 1, gi = 0 8i.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Second stage. Responder accepts if UR(c;A) ￿
UR(c;R):
(a) If c ￿ 1￿c, he accepts if (1￿￿R)c+￿R [￿Rc + (1 ￿ ￿R)1] ￿ 0 what
is satis￿ed for any c.
(b) If c > 1￿c, he accepts if (1￿￿R)c+￿R [￿R(1 ￿ c) + (1 ￿ ￿R)1] ￿ 0:





(ii) First stage. UP(1
2;A) ￿ UP(1





never o⁄ers c > 1
2. For c ￿ 1
2; ￿P < 1
1+￿P =) @UP
@c < 0 =) c = 0. If
￿P > 1
1+￿P ; @UP
@c > 0 what implies c = 1
2, and ￿P = 1
1+￿P with UP(c;A) being






Proof of Proposition 4. @Ui
@pij < 0 for each i;j 2 N =) pij = 0 for
each i;j 2 N. (i) If gi = 2 maxj2N fgjg, Ui(0;g￿i) > Ui(gi > 0;g￿i) when
￿i < ￿
1 = 1￿a
(n￿1)a(1￿￿i)+￿i: If this holds for each i, gi = 0 8i. (ii) For gi =
maxfgjg, @Ui
@gi = (1 ￿ ￿i)(￿1 + a) + ￿i [￿i(￿1 + a) + (1 ￿ ￿i)(￿1 + na)] > 0
when ￿i > ￿
2 = 1￿a
(n￿1)a(1￿￿i). Again, having this for all agents, gi = y for
each i. (iii) For ￿i 2 ( 1￿a
(n￿1)a(1￿￿)+￿i; 1￿a
(n￿1)a(1￿￿i)), i￿ s utility is decreasing with
respect to gi if she is the worst o⁄ player and increasing if he is not. Then,
gi = maxfg￿ig. (iv) If ￿i = ￿
1, i contributes such that she is not the worst
of player, i.e. gi 2 [0;maxfg￿ig). (v) If ￿i = ￿
2, i contributes such that
gi = maxfgjg.
Observe that a mixture of population such that there exist at least one j
with ￿j > ￿
2 and least one k 6= j with ￿k < ￿
1 and @i with ￿i = ￿
1 or ￿
2, the
equilibrium outcome is so that a part of population contributes fully and the
others do not contribute.
Proof of Proposition 5. Since UR(1
2; 1
2) ￿ UR(0; 1
2) by assumption, hence
c = 1
2 is never rejected. For any c > 1
2; UP(1
2; 1
2) > UP(1 ￿ c;1 ￿ c) =) c > 1
2











If 1 ￿ rP(:) ￿ sR(:); rP(:) is accepted. Otherwise, the concavity implies that
Proposer o⁄ers the closest share that is accepted, i.e. sR(:). The strict concavity
of the utility function guarantees the unicity of this equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 6. In the punishment stage of the game, player i pun-













j ￿j)2 > 0. Consider
a common contribution scenario with gi = g 2 [0;y] 8i. In the second stage,
28@Ui
@$i = 0 =) @Ui
@pij ￿ 0. Thus, pij = 0 8i;j 2 N in any common contribution
scenario. Since @￿i
@gi < 0 and @$i
@gi ￿ 0 (due to $i = 1=n), no i deviates from
the common contribution upwards. This proves the ￿rst part of the proposi-
tion. Consider any downward deviation. The concavity of Ui with respect to
￿i ensures that any i, such that ri > 1
n, can ￿nd it optimal to contribute less
until $i = ri. She will do so costlessly if she is not punished. This does not
happen if for 8k 6= i @Uk
@pki ￿ 0. We can ensure this for c ￿ ￿k=
P
j6=k ￿j. Given
the deviation of i, ￿k=
P
j6=k ￿j < 1=(n￿1). This proves the second part of the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 8.
1. Responder can only accept. UD(1
2; 1
2) = 1
2 > UD(1 ￿ c;c) 8c > 1
2.
Then, Dictator never o⁄ers more then 1
2. Given that c ￿ 1
2 and ￿D =
1 ￿ ￿R ,
@UD(1￿c;c)
























< 0 =) ￿D is minimal in ￿D = 1 where ￿D = 5
8.
2. @UR
@c > 0 for any c ￿ 1
2. For c < 1














. Proposer￿ s optimal behavior is identical with

































Proof of Proposition 11. Consider ￿rst the second stage of the game.
The equity payo⁄ of Responder is 1+0
2 . Denote p00 the second order belief of
Responder (that is the Responder￿ s belief about with which probability Proposer
believes Responder accepts the corresponding c).25 Responder believes Proposer
gives her c with probability p00 and 0 with probability 1￿p00. Then, the kindness
function ￿RPR(:) = cp00 ￿ 1
2.
Let us turn to the kindness of Responder toward Proposer. By receiving o⁄er
c, Responder can give Proposer 1 ￿ c by accepting or 0 by rejecting. However,
note that rejection is an ine¢ cient action. Thus, the equity payo⁄ of proposer
is 1 ￿ c, and the kindness of Responder toward Proposer can be either 0 if she
accepts or ￿(1 ￿ c) otherwise.






2). The belief consistency condition requires
beliefs to match in equilibrium. That is, if Responder accepts p00 = 1 and the





YR . If she rejects, p00 = 0 and
25Recall that, in the second stage, c is already know and ￿xed. Thus, p00 does not require
to be a function of c.
29c < c2 = YR
2+YR. Note that c2 ￿ (>)c1 for YR ￿ (>)0. Thus for c 2 [c1;c2], both
accept and reject may be optimal, depending on the beliefs players hold.
Let us now turn to the behavior of Proposer. Responder can be either
neutral (accepting) or mean (rejecting) to Responder. Accepting leads to kind-
ness of 0. Thus, only material payo⁄matters in Proposer￿ s utility and she o⁄ers
the minimal acceptance o⁄er. Beliefs consistency implies that, since Proposer
believes Responder accepts this o⁄er, she actually accept it. This argument is
compeltely independent of the values of YP and YR.
Next step is to show that there can be an equilibrium, in which the Pro-
poser makes an o⁄er that is rejected if YP and YR are large enough. If this really
is an equilibrium, the beliefs are correct and, by o⁄ering less than acceptable,
Proposer￿ s kindness and preceived kindess are ￿PR = ￿ c
2 and ￿PRP = ￿1 + c,
leading to UP(c;reject;c) = 0 + YP(￿1
2)(￿1 + c) for any c ￿ c2. If Pro-
poser deviates to any c0 > c2, his perceived kindeness does not change and
he always o⁄ers the lowest such c0. He would does not deviate as long as:
UP(c0;accept;c) < UP(c;reject;c) that is if YP > 1￿c
0
c0(1￿c). On the other hand,
there has to exist a c that is rejected with probability 1 and it exist for any
YR > 0. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 12. .
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The resulting utility function is:






















@pij = ￿c ￿ Yij(agj ￿ ay=2 ￿ p0
ji). Given that belief are consistent
in equilibrium so that p0
ji = pji, i punishes j if
@Ui(:jg)




Yij. If gj ￿ y=2 and pji = 0 8i, pij = 0.






2 and U(y ￿










a2y ; U(y) >
U(y ￿ ").




for each i 2 N. In such
a case, no punishment occurs till nobody deviates below
y







2 ). If i deviates downwards (resp. upwards) by




2 )(ag ￿ a" ￿
ay
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2 )(ag + a" ￿
ay
2 )). It
is pro￿table to deviate unilaterally for i if:
￿ U(g ￿ ") > U(g) ()
P




￿ U(g + ") > U(g) ()
P




These conditions are exclusive, so - unless for all i 2 N
P




- no such common contribution is optimal.
To prove that gi =
y





2 ￿ " with " 2 (0; c
amaxfYjig) and i does not punish. The utility of




2 ￿ a" ￿ cpji + a"Yji:pji. She does not punish if
@Uj
@pji < 0 () c
aYji > " what is so for all i by assumption on ". Given, i is not
punished, her psychological utility does not change and she earns (1 ￿ a)" > 0
in the sel￿sh part. Then, he prefers to deviate downwards.






for each i 2 N.




















2 ￿ pji). Observe that 1￿a





2 ￿ pji) for
all considered b g and whatever pji.
















@pij < 0 () Yij < c(
ay
2 + pji)￿1. If noone punishes and Yij < 2c
ay 8i;j
s.t j 6= i, no contribution can be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 13. 2nd stage. UR(c;A) = c + (1 ￿ c)aR+￿RaP
1+￿R ￿





any c ￿ ￿ aR+￿PaP
1+￿R￿aR￿￿RaP
if aR + ￿RaP ￿ 0
if aR + ￿RaP < 0.
If aP = 1 and aR = 1, the utility is the same for any c:
1st stage. UP(c;A) = (1 ￿ c) + caP+￿PaR




1+￿P . Since aP +￿PaR ￿ 1+￿P,
@U(c;A)
@c < 0 if aP +￿PaR < 1+￿P.
Otherwise, aP = aR = 1, UP(c;A) = 1 > 0 = UR(c;R) for any c.
Proof of Proposition 14. 2nd stage.



























@pij = ￿c ￿ (
ai + ￿iaj
1 + ￿i
), ￿rst stage contributions have no e⁄ect.
Since the ￿rst stage have no in￿ uence on the second, we can separate the
game into two independent parts: public good game without punishment and a
punishment game.
In the second stage, i punishes if @Ui
@pij > 0 what happens if aj < ￿
ai+c(1+￿i)
￿i .
In Public good game without punishment, i (does not) contributes if her
altruistic pro￿t from contributing over weights the negative e⁄ect on his material











(1 ￿ a)(1 + ￿i)
a






Agent i, then, contributes fully (nothing). If (11) is satis￿ed with equality, i is
indi⁄erent how much she contributes. Therefore, the heterogeneity of players
allow for three possible equilibrium outcomes: full contribution of all players,
zero contribution and polymorphic equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 16. The utility function of a player in the second stage
32when the vector of contributions g is given is
































If gj ￿ gi and pji = 0, no punishment takes place.
To prove the second part of Proposition, consider a full contribution sce-
nario without any punishment. If it is an equilibrium, beliefs are consistent






.26 The second part proves that in this case, i is not punished
in the second stage and her psychological part of her utility is not a⁄ected.
Since she wins in material terms "(1 ￿ a) > 0, she will deviate. Then, full con-
tribution cannot be an equilibrium. The same argument holds for any common
contribution, except zero contribution.
Consider, now, no contribution scenario with no punishment. Let i deviate
some ": If " ￿ c
￿i, her disadvantage is not high enough to punish and she only
looses in material terms. Then, only " > c
￿i can be considered. Nevertheless,
even this is not optimal for player i. Consider the second stage. If i does not
deviate, Ui(0) = y. If he does, the relevant utility is (12). Then, take into
account that each j 6= i anticipates from (13a) the punishment and i knows it,
i.e. pij = p00
ij. Since i cannot alter j￿ s payo⁄, the psychological part of (12) is
zero and only material payo⁄matter. It decreases by this deviation, i, therefore,
prefers not to deviate.
Proof of Corollary 17. The last part of Proposition 4 shows that it is
not optimal to deviate upwards from common contribution level in the case of
null contribution scenario. The same argument can be used for any common
contribution scenario.
Let us now check any possible unilateral deviation downwards. Consider
an agent i who deviates by an amount ". Since there is always at least one
player who punishes him, the utilities without and with deviation are Ui(g) =





Ui(g) > Ui(g ￿") () k > (1￿a)(k ￿c) what always holds. Now consider an
agent j 2 K who punishes i and let prove that she does not prefer to deviate
from the punishment strategy. If she punishes, Uj(:;pji = 0) = y ￿ g + ang ￿
a" ￿ c "





ij). We have pji = p0
ji = 0
and p00
ij = pij = "
k￿c. Let verify that the punisher does not like to deviate in
his punishment strategy downward by a small ￿. If so, he earns ￿c in material
26This deviation is clearly fully intentional.
33payo⁄ and looses ￿j(c￿ ￿ ￿)(￿) < 0 in psychological utility. Then, he does not
deviate if ￿j(￿c￿ + ￿)(￿) > ￿c , ￿j > c
￿(1 ￿ c)￿1.
6 Appendix B
In this section, we formally introduce the two-player version of the model of
Falk and Fischbacher (2004).27
Let Di be the the set of nodes where i moves with d being a node of this
player, Ad the set of actions in node d and F the set of end nodes of the
game. Being P(Ad) the probability distribution over actions in node d, Ai = Q
d2Di P(Ad) is player i￿ s set of behavior strategies. Last, ￿i(d;ai;aj) denotes
the expected payo⁄ conditional on node d.
Again, let bij 2 Aj and ciji 2 Ai be ￿rst and second-order beliefs of player
i, respectively.
The utility function of Falk and Fischbacher can be divided into 2 parts:
sel￿sh and psychological. The latter part can be further divided into the kind-
ness and reciprocation terms. The kindness term is a product of the outcome
term, which determines whether the individual feels treated kindly or not, and
the intentional factor de￿ning the intention of action on basis of all alternatives.
Reciprocation term re￿ ects the response of a player to (un)kindness
First, de￿ne the outcome term as 4(d) = ￿i(d;ciji;bij) ￿ ￿j(d;bij;ciji):
Whether an action is considered kind depends on the sign of the outcome term.
If the outcome term, 4, is positive (negative) the individual is in (dis)advantageous
position. Observe that ￿j(d;bij;ciji) measures i￿ s belief about how much j want
to keep for herself. The outcome term re￿ ects the crucial di⁄erence between this
model and that of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). In this case, the ref-
erence point is not the equitable payo⁄. Its role picks the opponent￿ s payo⁄.
Then, i feels treated unkindly by j if she earns less than j does.
Note that the outcome term does not take into account (un)kindness of the
path to d. This feature is included in the intentional factor, #. It depends on
the set of all alternatives. Traditionally, let Sj be the set of pure strategies of
j and ￿i = f(￿i(ciji;sj);￿j(n;ciji;sj)) j sj 2 Sjg the set of all alternatives i
beliefs j can o⁄er her. Whether payo⁄ distribution (￿0
i;￿0
j); given that j had
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j, ￿i > ￿0
i and ￿i ￿ ￿j
if ￿0
i < ￿0
j, ￿i > ￿0
i and ￿i > ￿j
if ￿0
i < ￿0
j and ￿i ￿ ￿0
i
where "i 2 [0;1] is an individual pure outcome concern parameter. It measures
player￿ s pure concern for equity. If, for instance, it equals one we get back to
pure distributional inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
27The Appendix of Falk and Fischbacher (2004) provide the multiperson version.
34The intentional factor is formally de￿ned as follows:
#(d) = maxf￿(￿i;￿j;￿i(d;ciji;bij);￿j(d;ciji;bij)) j (￿i;￿j) 2 ￿ig:
Then, # 2 [0;1] such that # = 1 means that 4 is induced by fully intentional
play. The formal de￿nition seems extremely di¢ cult, so it deserves more at-
tention. The intuition full intentionality is that an agent￿ s action is considered
intentionally kind, if he had the opportunity to be less kind, and it is intention-
ally unkind if more generous and still reasonable alternative exists; reasonable
meaning that the opponent would still be in payo⁄ advantage. Figure 5 il-
lustrates graphically the logic of the latter case. From the point of view of a
player, the black point represents a fully intentional, unkind choice, because her
opponent has a possibility to give her a higher payo⁄, remaining still in better
position
Put Figure 5. around here
As mentioned above, the kindness term, ’(d), is the product of distributional
term and intentional factor and express in monetary terms how the player feels
treated by his opponent.
Last, to de￿ne the reciprocation term, let ￿(d;f) denote unique node that di-
rectly follows d on the way to an end node f. Set ￿(d;f) = ￿j(￿(d;f);ciji;bij)￿
￿j(d;ciji;bij). It measures how much i alters j￿ s payo⁄ by his move in d.
With all the terms de￿ned above, the utility function has the following
form:28





The parameter ￿i measures individual concern for reciprocity.
28In the utility function, d ! f states for nodes f that follows d (both directly or undirectly).
35Figure 1: The contrast between Public good game with/without punishment.
Above: Partner treatment. Below: Stranger treatment







Figure 2. Equilibrium o⁄er of a Dictator

































5/5 game 2/8 game

























































5/5 game 2/8 game
8/2 game 10/0 game
Figure 3. Mini-ultimatum games (Falk et al. (2003)).

























Figure 5. Example of fully intentional choice.29
29This graph is taken from a persentation of Simon Gachter in Summer School in Trento
(Italy), July 2005.
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